The 'Hard Problem' and Self Hood

This is a reply to a comment on the article 'Self requisite for causation'. This is a sidetrack from the essay but it is an interesting set of musings nonetheless.

I am kind of convinced that there is, or has been, no a selves ever on the Earth. For animals I think all vertebrates have phenomenal, attentional, and cognitive self models. I don't know much about invertebrates.

Hi, glad you enjoyed the post and thanks for bringing this up!

It is certainly fascinating to uncover the similarities that organisms share, especially when it comes to consciousness and cognition. It is always mind blowing looking in to this field but there is always the danger of anthropomorphising - where we assign the attributes of humans to animals.

This is where 'the hard problem' really comes in to play, since there is no way we could even begin to imagine what 'other experience' was like. That being said though, it is not in the realms of fantasy to imagine that other neural networks support phenomenal consciousness in other vertebrates.

I think you are quite right to discount the possibility in creatures which lack neuronal functioning, such as insects. However, me might ask where do we draw the line?

As a thought experiment we might look at simpler brain structures until we find a species with one neuron say. We would then likely suggest that it is too simple to be conscious. Then we would be obliged, according to our categorisations of conscious & non conscious beings, to account for what level of neuronal functioning - i.e. number of neurons and patterns of firing etc. - is requisite for consciousness.

This problem is intractable and can only ever be an inference within the constraints of our hard problem of consciousness. Interestingly it also asks many more questions too such as, is there a golden ratio for neuronal functioning?

Is degree of consciousness something linearly or logarithmically related to neuron complexity?

Is consciousness some kind of on/off state that only occurs once a threshold has been reached?

In this sense, we are currently shut out of an answer to these problems and our attribution of what species are, or are not conscious, is nothing more than arbitrary guesswork. Add to this the problem of other minds, and the fellow sceptics among us have a field day everyday!

However, a recent article in New Scientist suggests that consciousness arises from temporal stable states in neuron firings, that last hundredths of a second. This really is interesting and may hold a key to unlocking this problem. http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22630164.500-sparks-of-consciousness-mapped-in-most-detail-yet.html

It is at least intuitive that chimpanzees and the like have quite a rich phenomenal experience. As far as the existence of self model is concerned, I have previously postulated that it arose as a structural requirement necessary before language appeared. 

I wrote an article about it in 2011 You will probably find it interesting but you will have to forgive my poor writing style and RT style erroneous reasoning as it was written before I was versed in philosophy! 

http://ghostvirus2011.blogspot.co.uk/2011/12/origins-of-self.html

In any case, the kinds of brain function we would be looking at would include episodic memory i.e. remembering events, the re-sequencing of 'nyeeps' (chunks of phenomenal data), behavioural recognition, and crucially, awareness of another's knowledge or cognitive ability.

The kind of example behaviours we would see from this functioning might include evidence of planning according to past experience, ability to make tools, noticing the intentions of others, and demonstrating awareness of whether others have noticed danger.

Interestingly, all these attributes are displayed by different members of the ape family. Crucially, this leads us to suggest that the self model is not limited to humans, and allows us to postulate that the brains modelling of the world in a relational capacity to the body that contains and protects it, is a function that could have evolved and is present in other species. There we have a plausible explanation of what self hood really is, instead of trying to say it is an entity divided from the 'objective world' as such.

As far as agency is concerned, I would suggest self hood consists in embodied human agency manifested as phenomenal experience. I.e. we are not something calling the shots separate from the brain, or passing judgement on the phenomena that arises, or rearranging 'nyeeps' in to new sequences to make plans.

'We' are nothing but the manifestation of the appearance of phenomenal experience arising within the brain as it goes about its business in the world. Hence, we can demonstrate the lack of control and free will that we thought we had because life lives itself, it always has without the need for bringing a separate 'you' in to the equation.

Naturally, we throw up many more questions (its always a can of worms!) such as, am I committed to saying consciousness is epiphenomena? How do we suppose there really is an external world in which these brains subsist? - I could go on but there is plenty to chew on here and I hope to explore these questions in my future ramblings!

The aim of self requisite for causation was not to 'convince' you there were never any selves, it was more to trash dualism and really question the suppositions upon which the notion of selves are based. 

Its not much use for me to convince anyone one model of reality is true over the other, however, I do want you to look in experience. Admittedly here we are dealing with the logical end of the bargain and I hope this helps to highlight the untested assumptions we have never dared or even thought about questioning.